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Polarization of the Sri Lankan Polity:  
An Analysis of Presidential Elections (1982 – 2005) 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious developing country that has 
enjoyed continuous universal adult franchise since 1931.  Under a new 
constitution enacted in 1978, Sri Lanka moved to a presidential system of 
government. Since 1982 five presidential elections were conducted.  This paper 
analyzes voter behavior by looking at all the five presidential elections. This 
study shows that all the winners of the presidential elections (except in 2005) 
won them by appealing across racial and religious boundaries with a popular 
mandate.  In 2005, there was a shift; the winner was able to secure victory by 
promoting a hard-line pro-Sinhala nationalistic platform.  This signals a 
departure from the previous elections, as in the past it was understood that 
minority support is crucial to win the Presidency.  The 2005 election sends a 
dangerous signal to a country that is ravaged by ethnic violence for over 20 
years. Further, this study looks at the voter behavior in urban vs. rural areas.  
Similar to the red vs. blue states divide in the US, in Sri Lanka, there is a 
strong urban-rural division in voter behavior. Logistic regression was used to 
analyze the results of the elections. 
Keywords: Sri Lanka, presidential elections, logistic regression, minority votes         
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Introduction 
Introduced in 1978, the second republican constitution of Sri Lanka changed the 
governmental structure to a Presidential system, replacing the “British style” parliamentary 
form of government.  This new constitution was a stark departure from its predecessor and 
followed the French model, where the president holds executive powers and is directly elected 
by the people.  Under this new model, the president is the chief executive of the country, 
supreme commander of the military, head of the government and the head of state. He or she 
also has authority to appoint the Prime Minister, the Supreme Court, and the Cabinet and also 
has the power to convene, suspend and dissolve the parliament.   
Prior to 1978, Sri Lanka enjoyed a fairly stable form of government, where there was a 
ceremonial president as the head of state and the head of the military.  The Prime Minister 
was the head of the government.  In the past the members of the parliament were elected by 
the “first past the post” electoral system, the new constitution changed the method of election 
to Proportional Representation (PR) (Warnapala & Yehiya, 2005).  Sri Lanka became the first 
democracy in the region to introduce a presidential form of government along with a PR 
system.  Both were two alien concepts to the region and even after 25 years, no other country 
in the region has followed Sri Lanka’s lead and changed their form of government.   
Many observers believe that this system was introduced purely because of personal 
ambitions of J. R. Jayawardena (Moore, 1990: 381).  Even though there was no public clamor 
for constitutional or electoral reforms, in 1977, the United National Party (UNP) led by J. R. 
Jayawardena came to power promising that he will change the constitution and move the 
country towards a presidential system of government.  Jayawardena received a landslide 
victory with 5/6 seats in the parliament (Commissioner of Elections).  Along with 
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constitutional changes, Jayawardena also used his victory to steer the country away from the 
rigid state control economic model (Athulathmudali, 1984: 76-77).  He also introduced much 
needed social and economic reforms and moved Sri Lanka’s foreign policy away from the 
Soviet/Indian axis.  On February 4, 1978, Jayawardena became the first executive president of 
the country.    
Ethnicity is a vital aspect in Sri Lankan politics and it is impossible to separate ethnic 
politics from “regular” political discourse.  Therefore, it is not surprising that Sri Lanka is the 
home for one of world’s longest and bloodiest civil wars.  This conflict began in 1950s and 
took a violent turn in the 1980s.  The two protagonists are the majority Sinhalese and the 
minority Tamils.  This crisis that has taken over 70,000 lives is based on ethnicity and not on 
religion (Reuters, 2008).  The minority Tamils are demanding for a separate state called 
“Eleam” in the north and east of the country based on some contested historical claims and 
alleged discrimination by successive Sinhala dominated governments (Gunasinghe, 1983; 
Manogaran, 1987; Wilson, 1988).       
Ethnically the Sri Lankan population can be categorized into four distinct 
communities, Sinhalese (74%), Tamils (12.6%), Muslims (7.1%) and Indian Tamils (5.6%) 
(Statistical Pocketbook, 1989: 14)1.  Religious composition of the country is 69.3% 
Buddhists, 15.5% Hindus, 7.6% Muslims and 7.5% Christians (including Catholics) 
(Statistical Pocketbook, 1989: 12).  Sinhalese are predominately Buddhists and the Tamils 
and Indian Tamils are predominantly Hindus and all three ethnic groups have a small, but 
highly influential Catholic/Christian minority (Warnapala & Yehiya, 2005: 440).  
 In this study we analyzed the voter behavior in Sri Lanka via two lenses.  Firstly we 
analyzed each ethnic group’s voter behavior in the five presidential elections.  Did the winner 
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appeal to all ethnic groups?  Do you need the minority support to win the presidency? To 
what extent the cultural terrain needs to be understood to craft the campaign message?  
Secondly we examined the rural-urban divide.  Since 1982, all presidents have had a strong 
urban bias, but in 2005 this stranglehold was broken and a rural candidate was able to defeat 
an urban candidate.  
The Presidential Electoral System 
 Sri Lanka elects its president every 6 years.  Up to date there have being 5 elections 
(1982, 1988, 1994, 1999 & 2005). In the Sri Lankan presidential elections one unique feature 
is that the both the first and the second rounds are conducted simultaneously (Reilly, 2001: 
117-119).  In most countries where there is a presidential system (ex: France, Liberia, Peru, 
Haiti), if the winner of the first round does not get more than 50% of the vote, there is a 
second round between the two top candidates.  
 In order to reduce cost and time, Sri Lankans vote for their candidates based on their 
preferences, by marking 1, 2 and 3 (Reilly, 2001: 118).  If the top candidate fails to get over 
50% of the votes, all the other candidates get eliminated, except the second place candidate.  
Then second preferences of the eliminated candidates will get counted.  If their second 
choices are for one of the top two candidates, the votes will get re-distributed.  It is worth 
noting that up to date no election has gone to this second round counting and all the winners 
have won in the first round itself.    
The Study, Methodology and Data 
 To examine Sri Lankan voter behavior, we selected Logistic Regression technique.  
Logistic Regression allows one to predict a discrete outcome from a set of variables that may 
be discrete.  Generally the dependent or response variable is dichotomous, such as win/loss.  
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When the dependent variable is dichotomous, then the dependent variable can take the value 1 
with a probability of success p, and value 0 with the probability of 1-p.  This type of variable 
is called a Bernoulli variable.  Logistic Regression makes no assumption about the 
distribution of the independent variables.  They do not have to be normally distributed, 
linearly related or of equal variance within each group.  The relationship between the 
predictor and the response variables is not a linear function; instead, the logistic regression 
function is the logit transformation of p. 
P = pi = e(constant+b1x1i+b2x2i+……..+bnxni)/(1+ e(constant+b1x1i+b2x2i+……..+bnxni)) 
Where b = the coefficient of predictor variables.  An alternative form of the logistic equation 
is give by: L = Log (pi/ (1-pi)) = constant + b1x1i + b2x2i +…………………. + bnxni 
Furthermore, by multiplying the estimate, bi, by the variance of the dependent 
dichotomy, which is pi*(1 - pi), allows us to interpret the net effect of a dichotomous 
independent variable on the dependent variable’s probability (Bohnstedt & Knoke, 1994: 
343).  The data for this study was taken from the Department of Elections’ Web site.  The 
web site had results of all the presidential and the parliamentary elections.  The data on the 
distribution of ethnic groups in each polling division was directly obtained from the 
Department of Census and Statistics (un-published data).  They are based on the 2001 census.   
 Prior to the introduction of the PR system, Sri Lanka had 160 electorates (polling 
divisions).  Even after the PR system was abolished, political parties use these electorates as 
their organizing unit to appoint local party organizers and to set-up local political party 
branches.  To this day unofficially this unit continues to function, and the Commissioner of 
Elections uses these units to announce election results.  Therefore, for this study we decided 
to use these 160 polling divisions to observe the pattern of voter behavior2.  By using the 
    
6
ethnic distribution data, we rank ordered the ethnic composition of each polling division 
according to the proportion of each ethnic group.  Points were assigned in the following 
manner: 00.01% - 20.00% = 1; 20.01% - 40.00% = 2; 40.01% - 60.00% = 3; 60.01% - 80.00% 
= 4; and 80.01% - 100.00% = 5.              
The logistic regression coefficient will show the change in the predicted log odds of 
win/loss for one unit change (20% increases in population) in the independent variable.  We 
felt that a 20% interval is desirable, as it will keep provisions for population growth, 
migration and displacement of people due to the ethnic conflict and due to the devastating 
Tsunami of December 2004.  Although the population distribution for each polling division 
would have changed between 1982 and 2005 (period of our study), the available data is 
reasonably sufficient to capture the ethnic composition of each polling division for the entire 
duration of our study.  Validity of this assumption is consistent with the ethnic composition of 
the members of the parliament for each area during the period of our study (Goonerathne, W. 
G & Karunaratne, 1996; Commissioner of Elections, 2006).  Therefore, utilizing the 2001 
census data to analyze the ethnic composition does not distort the picture of the polling 
divisions.   
 We also categorized each of the 160 electorates according to the degree of 
urbanization3.  In Sri Lanka, local government administration is divided according to the 
degree of urbanization and the size of the population it serves (Baxter et al, 2002: 350-351).  
In order to divide along the degree of urbanization, we categorized the 160 electorates into 
municipalities, urban councils or pradeshiya sabha (local councils).  Out of 160 polling 
divisions, there were 24 municipalities and 34 urban councils and the remaining 102 were 
pradeshiya sabhas.  We excluded the pradeshiya sabas from the urban model.  We classified 
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the urban council and the municipal councils in the following manner: Urban Councils 
(medium size cities) = 1, Municipal Councils (large metropolitan areas) = 2.    
In the cases where local government councils and parliamentary polling divisions were 
not properly over lapping with each other, we aligned them according to the population 
centers.  The data for categorizing a polling division whether it belongs to a municipality, 
urban council or a pradeshiya sabha was taken from the Commissioner of Elections.  In the 
next section, we will examine each presidential election using logistic regression techniques.  
The results of our study revealed some interesting patterns that are not regularly taken into 
consideration in Sri Lankan electioneering.  
1982 Elections 
 Sri Lanka had its first presidential election in 1982.  The election was between a 
hugely popular incumbent president (J. R. Jayawardena), supported by a strong government 
and against a very weak opposition.  The main opposition leader and former Prime Minister 
Sirima Bandaranayake was prevented from contesting as she was found to be guilty of alleged 
corruption and abuse of power by a special presidential commission (De Silva & Wriggins, 
1988).  As a result she lost her civic rights for seven years, thus preventing her from running 
for the presidency.     
   No one was able to mount an effective challenge to Jayawardena and his well-run 
UNP’s political machinery.  For most political observers, the only opposition candidate worth 
observing was Rohana Wijeweera, the founder-leader of the People’s Liberation Front 
(Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna) (JVP), a former Marxist terrorist group that had attempted to 
overthrow the government in 1971.  Jayawardena released the JVP leadership from prison in 
1977 under the condition that they would accept democratic principles.  The JVP, as a 
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political party deriving support from the younger and less formally educated rural youth has 
shown its ability to display some originality on its propaganda designed primarily to attract 
the socially-oppressed and the disillusioned (Warnapala, 2001).  It is in this 1982 election that 
the JVP tested its political strength at the ballot boxes.   
Table 1: 1982 election results 
Candidate Party Votes % 
J.R. Jayawardene United National Party 3,450,811 52.91% 
H.S.R.B. Kobbekaduwa Sri Lanka Freedom Party 2,548,438 39.07% 
Rohana Wijeweera Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna 273,428 4.19% 
Kumar Ponnambalam Akila Illankai Thamil Congress 173,934 2.67% 
Colvin R. De Silva Lanka Samasamaja Party 58,531 0.88% 
Vasudeva Nanayakakra Nawa Sama Samaja Party 17,005 0.26% 
    
Total Registered Voters  8,145,015  
Total Polled  6,602,617 81.06% 
Total Valid Votes  6,441,667  
Total Rejected Votes  80,470  
No. needed for outright victory  3,261,073  
No. of votes above the 50% mark  189,738  
Date of Poll: Sept 20, 1982    
No. of Polling Stations: 6985    
Source:  Election Commissioner 
 
Ethnic Model -1982 
When we carefully examined the 1982 election results, we made a few interesting 
observations.  In 1982, Jayawardena won 133 polling divisions (83%, p = 0.863), including 
all 7 Muslim divisions and the only Indian Tamil majority polling division.  The logistic 
regression model that was used to depict the results of the winner was: L = -0.952*Sinhala - 
2.095*Tamil + 2.459*Muslim + 1.027*Indian-Tamil + 6.356. Thus the Sinhala and Tamil 
polling division coefficients were negative and the Muslim and Indian Tamil polling division 
coefficients were positive.  Therefore Sinhala and Tamil polling divisions had decreased log 
odds of voting for Jayawardena, while Muslim or Indian Tamil polling divisions had 
increased log odds of voting for Jayawardena.  The effect of the Sinhala polling division 
coefficient was -11%. Similarly the effect of the Tamil polling division coefficient was -25%, 
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the effect of the Muslim polling division coefficient was 29% and the effect of the Indian 
Tamil polling division coefficient was 12%.  Thus Muslim and Indian Tamil polling divisions 
had increased probability of voting for Jayawardena by 29% and 12% relative to non Muslim 
and non Indian Tamil polling divisions.   
 This indicated that even though Jayawardena was able to secure votes from all 
segments of the country, he had more support from Muslims and Indian Tamils.  This is 
consistent with UNP’s philosophy and Jayawardena’s voter base.  Muslims community has 
traditionally supported the UNP and they directly benefited from UNP’s economic policies.  
In the case of the Indian Tamils, the UNP managed to get the support of the main political 
party/trade union, the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC).  Its leader S. Thondaman was a 
member of the Jayawardena’s cabinet (De Silva & Wriggins, 1988).   
In the 1982 ethnic model the Sinhala and the Tamil polling division coefficients were 
negative.  We argue that this is because the Tamil community’s vote went to the Tamil 
candidate (Kumar Ponnambalam), who won 8 out of 25 Tamil majority electorates (Election 
Commissioner).  The majority Sinhala vote was fragmented among the Sinhala or Marxist 
political parties and the main opposition SLFP, which always had a strong Sinhala voter base.  
Therefore, Jayawardena having an 11% negative coefficient effect in the Sinhala electorates 
relative to non-Sinhala electorates is understandable.    
Urban Model -1988 
When we looked at the corresponding urban model, the logistic regression equation 
was as follows: L = 0.188*urban + 1.57. In this model the urban polling division coefficient 
was positive.  Jayawardena won 86.2% (p = 0.862) of the urban polling divisions and the 
effect of the urban coefficient was  2%. According to this model an urban polling division had 
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increased chance of voting for Jayawardena by 2% relative to a non-urban (rural) polling 
division.  From this model we interpolated that a least urban polling division had an 85% 
chance of voting for Jayawardena.   
Figure 1: More urban a polling division becomes Jayawardena’s probability of winning increases. 
  
1988 Elections 
 Sri Lanka conducted its 2nd presidential election in 1988.  UNP nominated 
Jayawardena’s Prime Minister R. Premadasa.  It was one of the most violent elections in Sri 
Lankan history (Baxter, et al, 2002: 345).  SLFP nominated its leader Sirima Bandaranayake, 
who had re-gained her civic rights after a presidential pardon in January 1986.  In Sinhala 
heartland the JVP control was strong and the JVP’s boycott might have robbed in 1988 a 
Bandaranayake victory. Premadasa, with the help of the state machinery, cheating and his 
urban appeal scraped a narrow victory.   
Table 2: 1988 election results 
Candidate Party Votes % 
Ranasinghe Premadasa United National Party 2,569,199 50.43% 
Sirimavo Bandaranaike Sri Lanka Freedom Party 2,289,960 44.95% 
Osvin Abeygunasekara Sri Lanka Mahajana Pakshaya 235,719 4.63% 
    
Total Registered Voters  9,375,742  
Total Polled  5,186,223 55.32% 
Total Valid Votes  5,094,778  
Total Rejected Votes  91,445  
No. needed for outright victory  2,547,389  
No. of votes above the 50% mark  21,810  
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Date of Poll: Dec. 19, 1988    
No. of Polling Stations: 8060    
Source:  Election Commissioner 
 
Ethnic Model - 1988 
In 1988, Premadasa won 61.3% of the polling divisions (p = 0.613) and the logistic 
regression model for Premadasa was as follows: L = -0.856*Sinhala – 1.104*Tamil + 
0.847*Indian-Tamil + 4.934. Thus the Sinhala and Tamil polling division coefficients were 
negative and the Indian Tamil polling division coefficient was positive.  Therefore Sinhala 
and Tamil polling divisions had decreased log odds of voting for Premadasa, while Indian 
Tamil polling divisions had increased log odds of voting for Premadasa.  In this case the 
effect of the Sinhala polling division coefficient was -20%. Similarly the effect of the Tamil 
polling division coefficient was -26% and the effect of the Indian Tamil polling division 
coefficient was 20%.  Thus Indian Tamil polling divisions had increased chance of voting for 
Premadasa by 20% relative to non-Indian Tamil polling divisions.  Also, Sinhala and Tamil 
polling divisions had decreased probability of voting for Premedasa by 20% and 26% relative 
to non Sinhala and non Tamil polling divisions.  For the 1988 elections, the Muslim polling 
division’s coefficient was dropped from the model because of its high significance.   
Urban Model - 1988 
In the 1988 urban model and the logistic regression equation was as follows :L = 
0.887*urban - 0.887. Premedasa won 58.6% (p = 0.586) of the urban polling divisions and the 
urban coefficient was positive.  Therefore effect of the urban coefficient was  21% .Thus in 
1988 an urban polling division had increased chance of voting for Premadasa by 21% relative 
to a non urban (rural) polling division.  From the above model we interpolated that a least 
urban polling division (rural) had a 50% chance of voting for Premadasa.   
Figure 2: More urban a polling division becomes Premadasa’s chance of winning increases. 
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It is apparent from our urban model that Premadasa got elected to the presidency due 
to his urban appeal.  Premadasa was a “cross-over” politician who represented the only 
Muslim majority Colombo electorate in the parliament.  Born to a poor working class family, 
this self made populist was a street politician with a “common man” appeal.  On the May Day 
of 1992, Premadasa was murdered by a LTTE suicide bomber.  Premadasa was succeeded by 
his Prime Minister D. B. Wijetunge.  Wijetunge was able to control the lawlessness in the 
country.   
1994 Elections 
 By 1994, after 17 years of UNP rule, the country was fatigued with the UNP and the 
people were yearning for a change.  Bandaranayake was replaced by her charismatic daughter 
Chandrika Bandaranayake Kumarathunga.  She was able to shelf the old socialist philosophy 
and moved SLFP away from Sinhala nationalism.  She had solid liberal credentials and 
promoted cultural pluralism.  Kumaratunga was one of the few Sinhala politicians that took 
personal and political risks in meeting with the LTTE leadership in the 1980s.  She spoke of 
national reconciliation and was very popular in the Tamil heartland.  This was a mark 
departure for SLFP, as a party it had always portrayed itself as a Sinhala nationalist party.          
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In 1994, first the parliamentary elections were held.  SLFP and its grand coalition the 
People’s Alliance (PA) led by Kumaratunga, won with a narrow victory (113 vs. 112).  With 
this razor thin majority Kumaratunga formed a coalition government with the Sri Lanka 
Muslim Congress (SLMC) and became the Prime Minister.  Few months later the Presidential 
elections were conducted and the UNP nominated Gamini Dissanayake, a charismatic popular 
leader previously marginalized by Premadasa, who in turn had co-founded another political 
party. During the election campaign Dissanayake was killed by a LTTE suicide bomber.  
Dissanayake’s candidacy was replaced by his widow, a political novice4.   
Table 3: 1994 election results 
Candidate Party Votes % 
Chandrika Kumarathunga People’s Alliance 4,709,205 62.28% 
Nihal Galappaththi Sri Lanka Progressive Front 22,749 0.30% 
Srimathi Dissanayake United National Party 2,715,285 35.91% 
A.J. Ranasinghe Independent 22,752 0.30% 
Harischandra Wijethunga Sinhalye Mahasammatha 
Bhoomiputhra Pakshaya 
32,651 0.43% 
Hudson Samarasinghe Independent 58,886 0.78% 
    
Total Registered Voters  10,945,065  
Total Polled  7,713,232 81.06% 
Total Valid Votes  7,561,526  
Total Rejected Votes  151,706  
No. needed for outright victory  3,780,763  
No. of votes above the 50% mark  1,928,442  
Date of Poll: Sept 11, 1994    
No. of Polling Stations: 9580    
Source:  Election Commissioner 
 
 Dissanayake’s widow was no match for Kumarathunga.  Kumarathunga as the 
incumbent Prime Minister has already consolidated her power.  In this environment 
Kumaratunga’s victory was a certainty.  Kumaratunga as predicted got a landslide victory.   
She won all but 1 polling division in the country.  Therefore we could not use the logistic 
regression models to analyze the 1994 election, as the independent variable (win/loss) was not 
dichotomous in this case.   
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1999 Elections 
 The main contenders for the 1999 elections were the incumbent President 
Kumarathunga and UNP’s Ranil Wickramasinghe.  Between 1994 and 1999, Kumarathunga 
continued UNP’s neo-liberal economic policies, and bridged the gap between the UNP and 
the SLFP in economic policies and progress.  As a result, the 1999 election was not a battle on 
bread and butter issues, but on how to handle to ethnic crisis (Jayasuriya, 2005).  On the eve 
of the elections there was a Tamil Tiger suicide bomb attack.  The target was Kumarathunga’s 
last election rally.  She survived the attack, but permanently lost sight in one eye.  The public 
sympathy after the attack, the power of the incumbency, Wickramasinghe’s lack of charisma, 
ensured a second term victory for Kumarathunga.  The election was marred with violence and 
the international election observers found several election violations on both sides (Law and 
Society Trust, 2000; PAFREL, 1999).   
Table 4: 1999 election results 
Candidate Party Votes % 
Abdul Rasool Sri Lanka Muslim Katchi 17,359 0.21% 
Alwis Weerakkody Premawardhana People’s Freedom Front 3,983 0.05% 
Ariyawansha Dissanayaka Democratic United National Front 4,039 0.05% 
M. D. Nandana Gunathilaka Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna 344,173 4.08% 
Kamal Karunadasa People’s Liberation Solidarity Front 11,333 0.13% 
Chandrika Kumaratunga People’s Alliance 4,312,157 51.12% 
Tennyson Edirisuriya Independent 21,119 0.25% 
W. V. M. Ranjith Independent 27,052 0.32% 
Ranil Wickramasinghe United National Party 3,602,748 42.71% 
Rajiva Wijesinha Liberal Party 25,085 0.30% 
Vasudeva Nanayakkara Left and Democratic Alliance 23,668 0.28% 
Hudson Samarasinghe Independent 7,184 0.09% 
Harishchandra Wijayatunga Sinhalaye Mahasammatha 
Bhoomiputhra Pakshaya 
35,854 0.43% 
    
Total Registered Voters  11,779,200  
Total Polled  8,635,290  
Total Valid Votes  8,435,754  
Total Rejected Votes  199536  
No. needed for outright victory  4,217,877 
 
 
No. of votes above the 50% mark  94,280  
Date of Poll: Dec 21, 1999    
No. of Polling Stations:   9912  
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Source:  Election Commissioner 
 
Ethnic Model - 1999 
The SLFP led People’s Alliance (PA) candidate Kumaratunga won 81.3% of the 
polling divisions (p = 0.813). The logistic regression model was :L = 1.196*Sinhala + 
0.465*Tamil + 0.581*Muslim – 0.729*Indian Tamil -3.655. Thus in this election the Sinhala, 
Tamil and Muslim polling division coefficients were positive and the Indian Tamil polling 
division coefficient was negative.  Therefore Sinhala, Muslim and Tamil polling divisions had 
increased log odds of voting for Kumaratunga, while Indian Tamil polling divisions had 
decreased log odds of voting for Kumaratunga.  An Indian Tamil polling division had 
decreased chance of voting for Kumaratunga by 11% relative to a non-Indian Tamil polling 
division.   
When we carefully examine Kumaratunga’s victory, unlike Jayawardena or 
Premadasa, it is clear that she was able to get the support of the majority Sinhalese.  While 
Jayawardena and Premadasa in the ethnic models had negative coefficients for the Sinhala 
and the Tamil polling divisions, Kumaratunga was had a positive coefficient in both elections 
in which she won the presidency.  This goes to show SLFP’s strong Sinhala voter base.  It is 
apparent that Kumaratunga’s attempt to “secularize” the party had no significant impact at the 
ballot boxes.  Extreme Sinhala voters had not alienated the party and had continued to support 
the SLFP, inspite the JVP putting forward a candidate with an ultra-Sinhala nationalistic 
platform.  It seems Kumaratunga’s popular appeal assisted the party from any backlash from 
the hard-line elements within the Sinhala voter base.  To her credit, she moved the party away 
from communal politics.  In the ethnic model, Kumaratunga also had a positive effect in the 
Muslim polling divisions.  Even tough traditionally Muslims have supported the UNP, 
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Kumaratunga was able to get their votes in both elections.  This is because she was able to get 
the support of the SLMC and its splinter groups.  The only group that Kumaratunga was 
unable to get a positive coefficient in the ethnic model was in the case of the Indian Tamils.  
Indian Tamils are considered a “bloc vote” led by their trade union the CWC.  CWC aligned 
itself with the UNP in all the presidential elections.   
Urban Model - 1999 
For the 1999 elections, the logistic regression equation for the urban model was as 
follows: L = -0.668*urban + 1.846. Even though Kumaratunga won 70.7% (p = 0.707) of the 
urban polling divisions, as the urban polling division’s coefficient was negative, the effect of 
the urban coefficient was -14%. Thus an urban polling division had a decreased chance of 
voting for Kumaratunga by 14% relative to a non urban (rural) polling division. From this 
model we interpolated that a least urban polling division (ex: Deniyaya in the Matara district) 
had a 76% chance of voting for Kumaratunga. 
Figure 3: More urban a polling division becomes, Kumaratunga’s probability of winning slowly diminishes. 
  
 
 
But more urban a polling division got the percentage of votes Kumaratunga received 
decreased. Therefore in comparison, in the urban model, Kumaratunga was not very 
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successful. This showed that the SLFP is still very much a rural political party with a strong 
rural voter base, while the UNP is a strong urban party with a strong urban voter base. 
Elections 2005 
 Next election was held in 2005.  The run-up for this election was marred with 
controversies and legal battles.  An ultra Sinhala-Buddhist party called Jathika Hela Urumaya 
(JHU) (National Heritage Party) went to court5. UNP again nominated Wickramasingha, who 
had led the UNP for over 10 electoral defeats (at national and local levels) (Jeyaraj, 2005).  
The SLFP led coalition UFPA (United Freedom People’s Alliance) nominated Kumaratunga’s 
Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa.  Although Rajapaksa came from a rural political dynasty, 
his image and approach was very much akin to Premadasa’s image.  During the campaign he 
portrayed himself as a down to earth, small town lawyer, with a Sinhala-Buddhist and a 
socialist political orientation.  Rajapakshe was also considered as a non-intellectual and he 
even refused to debate Wickramasingha.  On the other hand UNP’s Wickramasingha was seen 
as non-charismatic, intellectual, aloof and elite.  The contrasts were similar to what occurred 
in the US during the 2004 presidential elections, between George Bush and John Kerry: Kerry 
was the aloof, intellectual, aristocrat, while Bush was perceived as down to earth friendly, 
non-intellectual, evangelical Christian. During the campaign, most observers would agree that 
Kumaratunga was undercutting Rajapaksa’s campaign to ensure a Wickramasingha victory 
(The Sunday Leader, 2005a; 2005b).   
Table 5: 2005 election results 
 
Candidate Party Votes % 
Mahinda Rajapaksa United Freedom People’s Alliance 4,887,152 50.29% 
Ranil Wickramasinghe United National Party 4,706,366 48.43% 
Siritunga Jayasuriya United Socialist Party 35,425 0.36% 
Ashoka Suraweera Jathika Sangwardhena Peramuna 31,238  0.32% 
Victor Hettigoda Eksath Lanka Podujana Pakshaya 14,458 0.15% 
Chamil Jayaneththi New Left Front 9,296 0.10% 
Aruna De Zoysa Ruhunu Janatha Party 7,685  0.08% 
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Wimal Geeganage Sri Lanka National Front 6,639  0.07% 
Anura De Silva United Socialist Party 6,357  0.07% 
J.A. Ajith Kumara Democratic Unity Alliance 5,082  0.05% 
Wije Dias Socialist Equality Party 3,500  0.04% 
P. Nelson Perera Sri Lanka Progressive Front 2,525  0.03% 
Shantha Dharmadwaja United National Alternative Front 1,316  0.01% 
    
Total Registered Voters  13,327,160  
Total Polled  9,826,908 73.74% 
Total Valid Votes  9,717,039  
Total Rejected Votes  109,869  
No. needed for outright victory  4,858,520  
No. of votes above the 50% mark  28,632  
Date of Poll: Nov. 17, 2005    
No. of Polling Stations: 10,486    
Source:  Election Commissioner 
 
Ethnic Model - 2005 
In a hard fought battle, SLFP’s Mahinda Rajapaksa was the winner.  In 2005, 
Rakapakse won 58.1% of the polling divisions (p = 0.581).  The logistic regression model 
was: L = 2.754*Sinhala + 1.911*Tamil – 1.352*Muslim – 1.464*Indian Tamil - 11.461.Thus 
the Sinhala and Tamil polling division coefficients were positive and the Muslim and the 
Indian Tamil polling division coefficients were negative.  Therefore a Sinhala or a Tamil 
polling division had increased log odds of voting for Rajapaksa, while an Indian Tamil or 
Muslim polling division had decreased log odds of voting for Rajapaksa.  The effect of the 
Sinhala polling division coefficient was 67%.  Similarly the effect of the Tamil polling 
division coefficient was 46%, the effect of the Muslim polling division coefficient was -33% 
and the effect of the Indian Tamil polling division coefficient was -36%.  Obtaining a positive 
coefficient from the Tamil polling divisions warrants an explanation and it will be discussed 
later. Thus an Indian Tamil and Muslim polling divisions had decreased chance of voting for 
Rajapaksa by 36% and 33% respectively relative to non-Indian Tamil and non-Muslim 
polling divisions.  While a Sinhala or a Tamil polling division had increased probability of 
voting for Rajapaksa by 67% and 46% relative to a non Sinhala and non Tamil polling 
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division.  Rajapakesha’s election victory has created long term implications to Sri Lankan 
politics.  He was able to break a cardinal rule in Sri Lankan presidential politics, i. e. that a 
serious candidate cannot win without minority support.    
 This sends out a dangerous message to the minorities.  It says that Sri Lanka is no 
longer a pluralistic multi-cultural, multi-racial country, but a Sinhala-Buddhist country, and 
that minority votes do not count, thereby giving ammunition to the groups such as the LTTE 
to demand for a separate state.  It is in this backdrop Rajapaksa was able to get a positive 
coefficient for Sinhala and the Tamil poling divisions.  Obtaining a positive coefficient from 
the Tamil polling divisions warrants an explanation.  Between 2002 and 2008 Sri Lankan 
government had a cease-fire agreement (CFA) with the LTTE.  The Norwegians negotiated 
this ceasefire and until the end of the ceasefire, they served as the monitors and the 
intermediaries for the peace talks.  It was assumed that the Tamils who live in the North and 
East would vote for Wickramasingha, as he was the architect of the CFA.  Further, prior to the 
presidential elections, LTTE pledged that they will not interfere with the elections and would 
give the Tamil population a free hand in voting (The Sunday Leader, 2005c; The Global 
Information Gateway, 2005).  But days before the elections, LTTE issued a decree, banning 
the Tamils living in the north and east from voting (Hindustan Times, 2005; Jayasinghe and 
Gunasekera, 2005; Rhode, 2005).  As a result of this forced boycott, only .36% of the people 
voted in the Tamil heartland (Jaffna District), thus preventing over 700,000 from voting 
(Commissioner of Elections, 2006; European Union Report, 2006).  Most of the polling 
divisions in the Northeast (Trincomalee District) and the East (Batticoloa & Digamadulla 
Districts), where the boycott could not be enforced were won by Wickramasingha.  In the 
Vanni district where the boycott was semi successful, where only 26% voted, 
  
Wickramasingha won 2 out of 3 polling divisions.  In the final tally, 
1.86% more than Wickramasingha and if not for the boycott, the outcome would have being 
vastly different.  For most observers, the 
casting the most important vote (the boycott).  Wickramasingha, as the Prime M
between 2002 and 2004, was able to turn the world opinion against the LTTE and push them 
towards a negotiated settlement.  
Urban Model - 2005 
In the analogues urban model, the logistic regression model was:
1.123. Rajapaksa won 60.3% (p = 0.603) of the urban polling divisions and as the urban 
polling coefficient was negative, the effect of the urban coefficient was
urban polling division had a decreased chance of voting for Rajapaksa by 24% relative to a 
non urban (rural) polling division.  When we changed the logistic model into the analogous 
exponential model, the new model was:
From this model we calculated that 
voting for Rajapaksa. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: More urban a polling division becomes, Rajapaksa’s chance of winning steadily decreases.
 It is clear from the figure
percentage of votes decreased.
the urban areas.  Urban polling divisions are UNP’s traditional strong holds.  In the 2005 
 
Rajapaksa
Rajapaksa victory was engineered by the LTTE, by 
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election the tradition of urban/rural divide has continued.  When we carefully dissected the 
five presidential elections, the results of this study exposed some facts that were clearly 
interesting.  What is evident is that the Sri Lankan polity is gradually getting “Balkanized” 
along ethnic, religious and regional lines.  Today there are political parties that cater to all 
these groups.  Jayawardena & Kumaratunga were able to appeal across ethnic and racial lines 
and also along the rural/urban divide.  Even Premadasa, who campaigned during one of the 
most violent times was able to get more rural votes and had popular appeal across the 
spectrum.  This characteristic faded in the 2005 elections.  No major candidate could appeal to 
all groups.    
The Sri Lankan urban/rural divide is similar to the red states/blue states divide in the 
US.  UNP dominates the urban areas, while the SLFP dominates the rural Sinhala polling 
divisions.  This urban/rural divide was breached in the 1982 (Jayawardena) and 1994 
(Kumaratunga) elections.  Both winners were able to encroach into each others territory.  It 
can be argued that this breach happened not because of the winning candidate, but because of 
the weakness of the loosing candidate.  In 1982 SLFP (Hector Kobbekaduwa) and in 1994 
UNP (Srima Dissanayake) were weak opposition candidates, who did not appeal to their party 
or to their base; therefore, because of lack of choice, the public voted by default.    
 Now let’s re-examine the 2005 elections and its future implications.  Because 
Rajapaksa was able to win the presidency with a hard-line agenda, this will be seen in the 
future as the recipe for winning elections.  Long-term implications of the Rajapaksa victory 
are profound, especially for the ethnic crisis that is engulfing the northeast region.  During the 
campaign he pledged to change SLFP’s stated policy of supporting a Federal solution for the 
ethnic problem and revert back to a unitary state (Mahinda Chintana, 2005: 32). He also said 
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that he would cancel the post-tsunami aid-sharing program (P-TOM) with the LTTE (Daily 
Mirror, 2005); amend the CFA (Mahinda Chintana, 2005: 35) and replace Norway as the 
mediator6.  
Rajapaksa ran his campaign similar to a United States presidential candidate in the 
primary elections.  In the US, during the primaries, “playing to the base” is a standard 
practice, so the base will get motivated to vote.  But during the presidential elections both 
major party candidates try to “appeal to the middle.”  In Sri Lanka, the opposite happened; 
“playing to the base” was Rajapaksa’s winning strategy, while Wickramasingha’s “appealing 
to the middle” back fired as he was seen as a “dove” that would cave in to the LTTE.  It is 
clear that Sri Lanka is a highly polarized country and the politicians are clearly exploiting 
these cleavages for their advantage.  Until there is a national consensus on how to resolve the 
ethnic question, the crisis will continue with a military stalemate.     
History is full of examples, where hard-line hawkish leaders made concessions to their 
opposing parties and their fellow citizens trusted the deals made by these leaders.  Richard 
Nixon with China, Ronald Reagan with Soviet Union, Arieal Sharon on Gaza and Menachim 
Begin with Egypt are just few examples.  Perhaps Rajapaksa with his “hawkish” agenda can 
come out of this deadlock.  However, there has to be a partner to negotiate.  All the 
indications are that the Tamils have not produced one.   
Concluding Remarks 
 In conclusion, the presidential system of government has further polarized an already 
fragmented country.  This system of government also introduced the possibility of co-
habitation between an all-powerful president from one party and a legislature from a different 
party.  Sri Lankan political culture does not allow for this kind of political co-habitation.  
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From 2002 and 2004, there was a period of cohabitation, and the public did not see a level of 
“check and balance” but saw constant “check mate” between the president and the parliament.      
 The Presidential system has also created an “imperial” presidency.  It was President 
Jayawardena, who famously said that he had the power to do everything "other than making a 
man a woman, or vice versa" (Asian Human Rights Report, 2006).  With this kind of an 
attitude towards the presidency by the architect of the presidential system, one might view 
suspiciously the reasons behind moving the country towards an all-powerful presidential 
system, while undermining the authority of the legislature.  Further, Sri Lanka enjoyed a 
stable governmental structure for over 70 years and there was no real justification to 
consolidate power under one person.  
 The cease-fire which was in existence since 2002 was cancelled in early 2008.  After 
the 2005 elections, the cease-fire was blatantly violated by both parties.  Since November 
2005 violence has steadily increased and within 6 months the death toll has exceeded 5000 
(Reuters, 2008).  Most of the blame for the escalation of violence lies directly at the feet of 
the LTTE.  After conspiring to elect a hard-line Sinhala president (via an election boycott), 
LTTE has steadily increased their terror campaign.  LTTE is currently banned in the European 
Union, the US, Canada, India and host of other countries.  Within the UNP the failure at the 
elections have prompted calls for reforms.  UNP wants to project that they too can cater to the 
needs of the majority Sinhalese and that they too prefer to distance themselves from the 
minorities.  This phenomenon is similar to the debates within the Democratic Party in the US.  
The moderate Democrats are demanding that the party should appeal to the middle, while the 
left wing Democrats are pushing the interest of the minorities, such as Blacks, Hispanics, 
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Unions & Women’s groups.  It is clear that the UNP is in danger of imploding, not because it 
went “soft” on the ethnic issue, but because of lack of leadership.   
As indicated at the beginning, the presidential system has contributed to further 
polarization in Sri Lankan politics.  Once this system was seen as a system that can unify the 
nation, but today it has increasingly become a tool for divisive electoral politics.  Because the 
2005 election was won only with the Sinhala votes, Rajapaksa will not feel he represents the 
entire polity, and will not have any obligation to take in to consideration of minority interests 
in policy issues.  Further, in the future presidential elections the candidates will not see a 
reason to cater to the needs of the minority and advocating a hard-line anti minority posture 
will be seen as the recipe for victory.  This will send out a dangerous signal to the minorities, 
which in return will fuel further political alienation and resentment. Further research is needed 
on the efficacy of the presidential system in Sri Lankan politics and its long-term 
implications.  There are several proposed constitutional amendments, among them are: revert 
back to the old “British style” parliamentary system, reduce the power of the executive 
president, create multiple vice-presidents representing all the ethnic groups, etc.  No clear 
alternative is in sight.  
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1Since 1989, the Tamil terrorists have not allowed the government to conduct census in their areas so we used 
1989 census data. 
2
 It is important to note that Sri Lanka does not have an Electoral College system that is similar to that of the US.  
Presidents are elected directly by the people; therefore it is technically possible for a candidate to win the 
presidency even by losing the majority of the 160 polling divisions. 
3
 A. J. Wilson (1975) in Electoral Politics in an Emergent State: The Ceylon General Election of May 1970 
categorizes the 145 electorates in to urban, rural and quasi-urban areas, based on multiple definitions such as 
local governmental classifications. 
4
 Replacing the dead politician with the bereaving widow or a member of the family is a very common South 
Asian phenomenon. 
5 Kumaratunga alleges that it was her own Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa who encouraged JHU to go to 
courts, as he was waiting for an opportunity to run for presidency and believed that he had a better chance of 
winning in 2005 and did not want to wait till 2006 to see Kumaratunga, plotting to give party’s nomination to a 
candidate of her liking, such as her brother.  JHU is an ultra Sinhala-Buddhist party; all its members in the 
parliament are Buddhist clergy. 
 
